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# U.S. Studies Plan to Integrate Nuclear Arms With a Missile Shield

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WASHINGTON, May 28 — The Defense Department is devising a nuclear war plan and command structure that would integrate offensive nuclear forces with the projected antimissile shield, according to United States and Canadian officials.

In the most extensive review of nuclear strategy in more than 10 years, the officials said, the plan was aimed at joining the nuclear sword with the antimissile shield in what one Reagan Administration official called a "good, coherent posture," possibly under the control of a new nuclear war-fighting command.

That official, who is in a policy-making position, said in an interview that the review was intended "to update nuclear employment plans and guidance for the transition from offense to defense in the 1990's." The official spoke on condition that he not be identified.

Until now, the United States has relied solely on offensive weapons, such as missiles, as a nuclear deterrent. It is the prospect of the shield, which officials have said could be operational in the early 1990's, and the perceived need to coordinate those two elements that has prompted the current review, officials said.

## Array of New Weapons

In addition, the United States has begun to field an array of new nuclear weapons, including the B-1 bomber, Trident submarines armed with ballistic missiles, the Pershing 2 medium-range ballistic missile, and cruise missiles based on land, sea and air.

The new weapons should be brought into cohesive war plans to give the President the ability to respond flexibly to a nuclear threat, the officials said. The Pershing missiles are controlled by the Army, the land- and air-launched cruise missiles by the Air Force, and the seaborne cruise missiles by the Navy. Opponents of the antimissile shield contend that weapons in the system could be used offensively.

The new plan is intended to coordinate the potential use of those weapons, plus others still being developed, with the shield of weapons on land and in space that is being fashioned with the aim of destroying long-range missiles and their warheads before they strike the United States.

The officials said the plan was to draw together forces and operations in the Strategic Air Command, the Navy's submarines bearing ballistic missiles plus submarines and surface ships armed with cruise missiles, and the new unified Space Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

The Army's offensive Pershing missiles and its antimissile development, the Air Force's antisatellite operations and the plan for deep underground basing of missiles now under development have also come under the scrutiny of the review group, the officials said.

The new plan has been discussed with Canadian leaders, according to officials in Ottawa. The North American Aerospace Command, known as Norad, is jointly operated by Canada and the United States, with a Canadian officer the second in command. Vital sensors, communications networks and a command center are also situated in Canada.

In Washington, the new plan is being worked out under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for policy, Fred C. Iklé, and his special assistant for nuclear employment policy, Ronald H. Stivers, the officials said.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have begun discussions of the issue, with officials saying that sharp differences have appeared between the Air Force, which favors the integrated plan, and the Navy, which seeks to retain control of its own nuclear weapons.

The plan will require President Reagan's approval before it can go into effect. A White House official said the President and the National Security Council had not yet discussed the plan, although White House officials have been working with those in the Pentagon.

From all accounts, getting an agreement will not be easy since strongly differing positions have been taken throughout the Government.

Officials in the Defense Department and the State Department were said to disagree on the need for a new strategy. Civilian officials and senior military officers in the Defense Department disagree on what it should be, and military leaders disagree among themselves.

In particular, officials said, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have resisted the idea of a new command that would have control not only of the offensive forces but also of whatever defensive system is produced by the Strategic Defense Initiative Office.

The Air Force and the Navy were said to be at odds, since the Navy has long insisted in controlling submarines carrying ballistic missiles. That issue has been compounded because attack submarines and surface ships are to have cruise missiles, which the Navy wants to control. The cruise missile can be described as a flying torpedo that is designed to fly low of the terrain.

## Cohesive but Flexible Plans

Mr. Iklé has been an advocate of breaking down distinctions between long-range nuclear weapons and medium-range arms such as the Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles being deployed in Western Europe, and integrating them into cohesive but flexible war plans.

But some strategists in the military services and civilian life contend that plans to fight a controlled nuclear war are futile. They assert that the destruction wrought by a nuclear attack would be so devastating that the only response would be all-out retaliation.

Beginning in 1960, the policy of the United States' governing the use of nuclear weapons has been moving away from the idea of massive retaliation in an all-out salvo at the enemy's cities.

Instead, strategists have specified political, military and economic targets that could be hit by weapons with improved accuracy, mainly missiles. To do that required elaborate war plans plus a command and communications apparatus to control the firing.

## Refinements of Strategy

A critical point came in 1974, when James R. Schlesinger, who was Secretary of Defense in President Nixon's Administration, devised a strategy in which a nuclear war was to be escalated in controlled stages while seeking to end the conflict by negotiation.

Later, President Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, refined that strategy in a document known as President Directive 59. It was further refined in the Reagan Administration in a document known as Defense Guidance in 1982.

Defense Guidance emphasized the need for nuclear forces that could survive a nuclear attack and be held in reserve for retaliation over a prolonged period of many months. Assured communications between the President and those forces would be vital.

Meantime, President Reagan, in October 1981, announced his program to modernize the strategic nuclear force, with public attention on the disputed MX intercontinental missile and the B-1 bomber, the first of which is to be delivered to the Air Force on June 29.

But officials at that time said the most important feature of the program was the \$20 billion to be spent on revitalizing the intelligence and communications apparatus that would provide warning of an attack and the means for ordering a retaliatory strike.

Since then, the Pentagon has begun programs to put new radar in the ballistic missile warning system in England and Greenland and to install new radar guarding the southeastern and southwestern approaches to the United States.